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NOTES
Appeal and Error: Flores v. State - Navigating the
Murky Waters of Harmless Error Review
L Introduction
"Justice" has been defined in as many ways as there are people who have aspired
to that office. Supreme Court Justice Learned Hand defined the concept as the
"tolerable accommodation of the conflicting interests of society."' According to this
definition, the concept of justice must encompass the interests of the innocent to go
free, the interests of society to hold the guilty accountable, and the interests of every
person who stands accused, guilty or innocent, to a fair trial!
Over the course of a century, these competing ideals have weathered much social
change.3 Policies advocating defendants' due process rights now face the growing
concern that criminal cases are litigated for too many years.4 Bowing to public
pressure to curb excessive appeals,5 appellate courts have relied on the harmless error
doctrine to avoid reversing convictions for errors which do not harm the substantial
rights of the defendant. 6
The doctrine's application in the midst of such conflict has charted a "wayward
course," 7 resembling the wanderings of the heroes of Homer's Odyssey,' who
continually lost their way at sea. Many courts and commentators have acknowledged
the increasing trend of reviewing courts' reliance on harmless error.9 Confusion
1. Phillip Hamburger, The Great Judge, LIFE, Nov. 4, 1946, at 122-23 (quoting Judge Learned
Hand).
2. See Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 700 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
3. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error
to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REv. 152, 157-58 (1991).
4. See Linda E. Carter, Harmless Error in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Case: A Doctrine
Misunderstood and Misapplied, 28 GA. L. REv. 125, 126 (1993); see also Janet Naylor & Todd Spangler,
Maryland's Gas Chamber Awaits, Idle for Three Decades, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1992, at B6
(contending that current system allows prisoners to delay their fate by "seemingly endless string of
appeals").
5. See Kenneth R. Brown, Constitutional Harmless Error or Appellate Arrogance, 6-JAN UTAH B.J.
18, 18-19 (1993).
6. See ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 15 (1970) (adopting language of
federal statute to define "harmless" as errors which do not "affect the substantial rights of the parties");
see also Jay E. Heit, Note, State v. Schuster: South Dakota Expands the Harmless Error Rule to Allow
Coerced Confessions, 39 S.D. L. REv. 635, 647-50 (1994) (describing doctrine as allowing review courts
to avoid setting aside the conviction for errors which had little likelihood of altering the outcome of the
trial).
7. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988, 998 (1973).
8. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, reprinted in 1 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF WORLD MASTERPIECES
172-521 (5th ed. 1985).
9. See, e.g., Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L.
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persists, however, concerning when harmless error analysis should be applied" and
which tests should be administered."
On February 13, 1995, in Flores v. State," the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals deviated from the course of increasing harmless error application. Under the
Flores decision, an instruction directing the jury to presume the defendant "not
guilty," rather than instructing the jury that the defendant was presumed innocent,
was deemed not harmless. 3 Further, the court concluded that this error violated the
defendant's constitational and statutory rights." Therefore, this error could never be
found harmless, regardless of the evidence suggesting the guilt of the defendant. 5
This note will first explore the historical development of the harmless error
doctrine, especially in relation to concepts as fundamental as the presumption of
innocence. Second, the facts of Flores will be presented as well as an analysis of the
court's holdings. Third, the rationale of the judges writing concurring opinions to the
order denying a rehearing which categorized the defective jury instruction as
"harmful per se" will be scrutinized. Fourth, the implications of the original Flores
decision will be discussed. Finally, judicial and legislative alternatives will be
examined and evaluated.
II. History of the Harmless Error Doctrine
The doctrine of harmless error dates back to eighteenth century England. At that
time, trial error required reversal only when it resulted in an incorrect verdict.
Concern for defendants' rights prompted the Exchequer Rule, 6 which required an
automatic reversal for any error. Gradually the public grew dissatisfied with
seemingly endless appeals. In response, Parliament passed harmless error legislation,
attempting to curb the lengthy appeals process while still acknowledging defendants'
rights. 7 Under the new legislation, a new trial could not be ordered without a
REv. 79, 79-80 (1988).
10. See John M.M. Greabe, Spelling Guilt Out of a Record? Harmless-Error of Conclusive
Mandatory Presumptions and Elemental Misdescriptions, 74 B.U. L. REV. 819, 822 (1994).
11. See id. at 828.
12. Flores v. State, 896 P.2d 558 (Okla. Crim. App.), reh'g denied, 899 P.2d 1162 (Okla. Crim.
App.), and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 548 (1995).
13. See id. at 562. "In the instant case, the jury was instructed that Appellant was presumed to be
not guilty rather than presumed innocent." Id.; see also Flores v. State, 899 P.2d 1162, 1163 (Okla. Crim.
App.) (Order Denying Rehearing) (Chapel, J., concurring), cert. denied, 116 U.S. 548 (1995).
14. See Flores, 896 P.2d at 559.
15. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1165 (Order Denying Rehearing).
16. See Jana J. Gre-n, Note, Arizona v. Fulninante: The Harmful Extension of the Harmless Error
Doctrine, 17 OKLA. Crrt U. L. REv. 755, 762 (1992) (citing Crease v. Barett, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (Ex.
1835) as creating the Exchequer rule).
17. See Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 421, 422 (1980) (noting that the Judicature Act of 1873 was Parliament's response to the
Exchequer Rule, which rasulted in more retrials than new trials); see also TRAYNOR, supra note 6, at 8-9.
The Judicature Act of 1873 provided that technical errors at trial would not create reversal. Instead, the




showing of some substantial wrong."9
America followed suit in adopting the Exchequer Rule19 but was reluctant to
accept the harmless error doctrine. 2 As in England, reviewing courts in the United
States encountered much criticism for lengthy appeals' Eventually, public demands
persuaded Congress to pass a federal harmless error statute." Like its English
counterpart, this statute precluded reversal when the denial of a substantial right
caused no injury to the litigant'
Initially, the United States Supreme Court applied harmless error analysis only to
nonconstitutional errors.' The test for "harm" analyzed the error's effect on the
jury's verdict rather than the evidence pointing to the defendant's guilt.' However,
the Court's landmark decision of Chapman v. California broadened the doctrine's
reach to include federal constitutional errors.
Recognizing that some constitutional errors may be "so unimportant and
insignificant!" to be deemed harmless, the Court in Chapman set forth a two-
pronged test. The threshold step required reviewing courts to determine whether the
constitutional error was susceptible to harmless error analysisO The second step
addressed whether the state proved "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." 9
Over the next thirty years, the Supreme Court refined the parameters for each of
these factors. In Arizona v. Fulminante" the Court provided further guidance for
18. See TRAYNOR, supra note 6, at 8-9.
19. See Ogletree, supra note 3, at 156. In discussing the history of the Exchequer Rule in England,
Ogletree notes that "[a] parallel development occurred in the United States. American courts adopted
the rule of automatic reversal as part of their common law inheritance from England." Id.
20. See Greabe, supra note 10, at 822..
21. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6, at 257 (1984).
22. See Act of May 24, 1949, Pub. L. No. 72, § 110, 63 Stat. 89, 105 ("On the hearing of any
appeal .... the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or
defects which do not effect the substantial rights of the parties."); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)
(providing that defects, irregularities or variances which do not affect substantial rights of the parties
should be disregarded).
23. See Act of May 24, 1949, § 110, 63 Stat. at 105.
24. See Robin A. Colombo, Note, Brecht v. Abrahamson: Hard Justice for State Prisoner?, 35 B.C.
L. REV. 1103, 1106-07 (1994) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)).
25. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763-64 (1946).
26. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
27. Id at 22.
28. See id. at 20-22. "Tlhere may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular
case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be
deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction." Id at 22; see also Charles F.
Campbell, Jr., An Economic View of Developments in the Harmless Error and Exclusionary Rules, 42
BAYLOR L. REV. 499, 505 (1990) (acknowledging that in Chapman the Court neglected to provide
adequate guidance for assessing when constitutional errors are subject to harmless error analysis and
when error requires automatic reversal).
29. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; see also id. at 23 n.8 (noting that at least three exceptions remained
to constitutional error subject to harmless error analysis: one, use of coerced confession; two, deprivation
of a right to an attorney; and three, trial before a biased tribunal); see also Brown, supra note 5, at 18.
30. 499 U.S. 279 (1991). The Fulminante Court found that coerced confessions would be subject
1996]
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assessing whether a constitutional error was subject to harmless error analysis. The
Court defined this threshold inquiry as dividing constitutional errors into two types:
trial errors and structural errors.3'
"Trial error" occutrs during the presentation of the case to the jury. The impact of
this error on the mind of the jury may be weighed against all of the other evidence
presented at trial. Therefore, "trial errors" are subject to harmless error review. 32 In
contrast, a "structural error" influences the entire structure of the trial mechanism.
The error's impact on the verdict is not clearly assessable nor is it capable of
comparison with the weight of the evidence against the accused. As a result, these
errors defy analysis. by a harmless error standard. Examples of structural errors
include the denial of counsel and the bias of a judge.33
Furthermore, the Court has shifted its focus in determining what constitutes
"harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt." In addition to the Chapman analysis,
which evaluates whether the constitutional error "did not contribute to the verdict,"'
the Court has set forth two other tests. First, in Harrington v. California," the Court
asked whether the evidence of the defendant's guilt was so overwhelming that the
error would not have changed the result of the trial.' Second, the Court in
Delaware v. Van Ar.delP7 created a hybrid of the Chapman and the Harrington tests
by balancing both the effect of the error and the weight of all admissible evidence.
These two cases signaled a new perspective in harmless error analysis. Under
Chapman, courts focused solely on the prejudicial nature of the error. 9 In contrast,
the modifications in Harrington and Van Arsdell redirected courts to evaluate the
nonerroneous evidence pointing to the defendant's guilt. ' Consequently, the variety




34. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
35. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
36. See id. at 251-54. Supreme Court cases applying the Harrington test include: United Stafes
v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 507-12 (1983) (finding the error harmless); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S.
223, 230-33 (1973) (holding the error harmless); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1972)
(holding the error harmless); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430-32 (1972) (finding the error
harmless).
37. 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
38. See id. at 684. Circuit courts applying a hybrid test include: United States v. Veltmann, 6 F.3d
1483, 1500 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding error not harmless);. United States v. McMahon, 938 F.2d 1501,
1505-06 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding error harmless); United States v. Copley, 938 F.2d 107, 110 (8th Cir.
1991) (holding error harmless); United States v. Thompson, 908 F.2d 648, 652-53 (10th Cir. 1990)
(holding the error not harmless); United States v. Lang, 904 F.2d 618, 625-27 (1 lth Cir. 1990) (holding
the error harmless).
39. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 ("Certainly error, Constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly
prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to
show that it was harmless.").
40. See Ogletree, supra note 3, at 159 (citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983)
(holding that "it [was] the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore
errors that are harmless, including constitutional violations"); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986)




of tests applied to determine harmlessness has created discontinuity and confusion
among the lower courts.4'
By 1967, all fifty states had adopted some form of the harmless error doctrine.42
Oklahoma recognized this doctrine prior to statehood.4 Early forms of the state
harmless error statute required "examination of the entire record" by the appellate
court." Eventually, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals accepted the Chapman
test' However, ambiguity persists concerning when a constitutional error should
be subjected to harmless error analysis and which standard should be applied to prove
harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt." Moreover, conflict continues to arise
surrounding the application of this doctrine to nonconstitutional violations.47
In its denial of rehearing in Flores v. State," the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals addressed whether harmless error analysis applied to an erroneous
presumption of innocence jury instruction 9 The majority categorized this error as
automatically reversible but failed to identify a cognizable test by which other
substantial violations could be analyzed.' Although narrowing the scope of the
harmless error doctrine for defective presumption of innocence jury instructions,
Flores may have done little to correct the doctrine's "wayward course."
III. Statement of the Case
Jose Flores strangled Sheila Ann Brown and disposed of her body in a trash
dumpster.5 ' The simplicity of the facts, however, has been obscured by the ensuing
procedural history. The case has moved through four phases: the trial by jury, the
defendant's appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the State's petition
for rehearing, and the State's petition to the United States Supreme Court for writ of
not the rule")).
41. See Gregory Mitchell, Comment, Against "Overwhelming" Appellate Activism: Constraining
Harmless Error Review, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1335, 1337-38 (1994).
42. See Ogletree, supra note 3, at 157.
43. See Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 697 (citing Morris v. Territory, 99 P. 760 (Okla. 1909)).
44. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1068 (1951); see Stains v. State, 297 P.2d 421, 424 (Okla. Crim. App.
1956).
45. McCraw v. State, 476 P.2d 370,374 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970) (applying Chapman test); see also
Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 705 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (Chapel, J., dissenting) (claiming that 20
OKLA. STAT. § 3001.1 (1991) is a codification of the Chapman test).
46. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, over the course of five decades, has employed the
"overwhelming evidence test," the "contribute to the verdict" test, a hybrid of these two, the "impact on
the mind of the jury" test, and an "impact. . ." test combined with a "contribute to the verdict" test.
Each of these tests has been employed in each of the last five decades without the court clearly
distinguishing when to utilize a given test. See infra note 201.
47. In Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 705-06 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), the dissent disagreed with
the majority that nonconstitutional errors required a standard of review other than Chapman.
48. 899 P.2d 1162 (Okla. Crim. App.) (Order Denying Rehearing), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 548
(1995).
49. See id at 1163 (Order Denying Rehearing) (further explaining the court's holding in the original
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certiorari.
Flores was tried by jury for the crime of murder in the first degree in the District
Court of Tulsa County. The jury found him guilty of first degree murder" and
recommended punishment of life without parole. Flores appealed.'
On appeal, the Odahoma Court of Criminal Appeals discussed two errors." First,
the trial court should not have departed from the standard instruction requiring the
state to prove "each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."' Second,
because the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction on the presumption of
innocence, reversal was required.Y The following discussion focuses on the
resolution of the second issue.
The instruction a. administered read as follows:
You are instructed that the defendant is presumed to be not guilty of the
crime charged against him... unless his guilt is established by evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt and that presumption of being not guilty
continues... unless every material allegation.., is proven by evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt.58
In contrast, the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction Criminal No. 903 provides:
"The defendant(s) [is] [are] presumed innocent of the crime(s), and the presumption
continues unless.., you are convinced of [his] [her] guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."
Judge Strubhar, author of the majority opinion, recognized the trial judge's
deviation from Oklahoma law as error.' Reasoning that the defective jury
instruction lessened the burden of proof, the majority found that the error constituted
a "substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right" and was not "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."'" Judge Lumpkin concurred with the majority that the
error in this case constituted reversible error. However, he disagreed with the
majority's standard of review. The majority applied the Chapman harmless error
standard for constitutional violations. This standard evaluates whether the error was
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." In contrast, Judge Lumpkin looked to the
harmless error standard for nonconstitutional violations. The test for nonconstitutional
errors determines whether the reviewing court had 'grave doubts' [that] the error...
did not have a 'substantial influence' on the outcome of the trial."'62
52. See Flores, 896 P.2d at 559.
53. See 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.7(A) (1991).
54. See Flores, 896 P.2d at 559.
55. See id. at 558.
56. See id. at 562-63.
57. See id. at 559.
58. Id. at 560.
59. Id. at 560 n.1 (alterations in original).
60. See id. at 560.
61. Id. at 560-61.





Upon reversal, the State of Oklahoma filed a petition for rehearing with the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.' While the court found that the complaints
raised in the petition did not merit rehearing, conflict arose concerning the future
application of the original Flores opinion." As a result, four of the judges wrote
opinions. Dissenting Judges Johnson and Lumpkin contended that similar statutory
violations in other cases should be subjected to harmless error analysis on a case-by-
case basis.' Conversely, the concurring opinions of Judge Strubhar and Judge
Chapel argued that Flores would automatically reverse all cases involving the
defective "presumption of innocence" jury instruction."
After the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals denied a rehearing, the State of
Oklahoma petitioned the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari without comment, declining to address whether this
error is amenable to harmless error review.' Thus, the four opinions accompanying
the order denying the rehearing remain the primary source of guidance for
determining how the court will apply Flores in the future. The folloving discussion
examines the arguments set forth in these four opinions and evaluates the contention
that all cases involving the defective presumption of innocence jury instruction
require automatic reversal.
IV. Flores Rationale: Applying a Harmful Per Se Standard
The courts have been called upon to reconcile the competing goals of procedural
fairness and the finality of judgments. While each goal represents a valid social
interest, commentators have emphasized the dangers of the opposing goals when
taken to extremes.' For example, the protection of a defendant's rights could lead
to endless appeals for the guilty. On the other hand, an emphasis on swift and final
judgments could sacrifice the rights of the accused to a fair trial.
Courts have resolved this dilemma in favor of freeing the guilty rather than risking
the wrongful conviction of the, innocent.' Uncertainty has persisted, however, in
determining when and how to apply a harmless error analysis to achieve a just
balance of these interests.!' The court in Flores faced a similar conflict. While the
63. See Flores v. State, 899 P.2d 1162, 1163 (Okla. Crim. App.) (Order Denying Rehearing), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 548 (1995).
64. See id. at 1163.
65. See id. at 1170 (Johnson, P.J., dissenting); id. at 1173 (Lumpkin, J. dissenting).
66. See id. at 1168 (Strubhar, J., concurring specially); id. at 1164 (Chapel, V.P.J., concurring
specially).
67. See Oklahoma v. Flores, 116 S. Ct. 548 (1995).
68. See Brown, supra note 5, at 18 (describing how the "results oriented" doctrine could permit
unreasonable searches and seizures and coerced confessions); see also Greabe, supra note 10, at 830
(analyzing a case which emphasized the state's interest in finality of convictions, comity, federalism, and
the prominence of the trial and which held the violation of the accused's Miranda rights to be harmless
error).
69. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, L, concurring).
70. See Saltzburg, supra note 7, at 998 (describing the history of harmless error as instable and
uncertain); see also Carter, supra note 4, at 134 (discussing interpretational problems for "harm" when
the state's interest in a correct result has been met).
1996]
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court unanimously agreed that the error in Flores required reversal, controversy later
arose concerning the decision's application to other cases." In response, Judge
Strubhar and Judge Chapel, in separate concurring opinions to the order denying a
rehearing, presented three reasons for categorizing the defective jury instruction as
harmful per se.
First, the defective instruction violated the "fundamental" principle of the
presumption of innoence.n Second, in analyzing the defective instruction, the state
harmless error statute governs rather than the more liberal federal standard.' Third,
the role of the court in appellate review is to act with restraint yet still to protect
against governmental violations of constitutional safeguards. 4 Each of these
arguments will be evaluated in turn.
A. Violation of a Fundamental Principle5
The first argument addressed the nature of the right which was violated. The
concurring opinions described the presumption of innocence as fundamental to our
system, based upon two lines of reasoning." First, the presumption of innocence is
a fundamental principle based upon jurisprudential traditions.' Second, the
presumption of innocence is fundamental because it is a companion principle to the
constitutional guarantee that in criminal cases the State must persuade the jury of the
defendant's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt."7
Categorizing a principle as fundamental is significant because the violation of a
fundamental error denies the defendant of due process and requires reversal of the
conviction.' As a reMlt, history has helped define the boundaries of the fundamen-
tal concepts of liberty. For instance, courts have described fundamental concepts as
those which are rooted in the traditions and collective conscious of the people." In
71. See Flores v. Stale, 899 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Okla. Crim. App.) (Order Denying Rehearing), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 548 (1995).
72. Judge Chapel claims that dismissing this error as harmless would undermine crucial tenets of
our democratic society. See id. at 1168 (Chapel, V.P.J., concurring specially). Judge Strubhar contends
that it would "eviscerate" a fundamental principle to our system. See id. (Strubbar, J., concurring
specially).
73. See id. at 1164 (Chapel, V.PJ., concurring specially).
74. See id. at 1169 (Strubhar, J., concurring specially); id. at 1164 (Chapel, J., concurring specially)
(refraining from "judicially legislating" an amendment to the harmless error statute); id. at 1165 n.5
(Chapel, V.P.J., concurring specially) (noting that "it is not the business of this Court to sit as a super-
jury. It is our business to see that the trial courts follow the law. And, if they do not follow the law, it
is our sworn duty to reverse them however difficult or unpopular it may be to do so").
75. See id. at 1168 (Strubhar, J., concurring specially) (describing the presumption of innocence as
a "principle so fundamental to our system").
76. See id. (Strubbar, J., concurring specially).
77. For example, Judge Strubhar, who wrote a concurring opinion with the order denying the
rehearing, authored the original Flores decision. See Flores v. State, 896 P.2d 558, 561 (1995) (citing
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (describing the presumption of innocence as axiomatic
and elementary)).
78. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1169 (Strubhar, J., concurring specially).
79. See Sevits v. Statr, 651 N.E.2d 278, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (defining a fundamental error as
one "so blatant and prejuicial, that if not corrected, it would deny the defendant due process").




addition, those principles which are frequently repeated in common law jurisprudence
are upheld as fundamental.8 Ultimately, courts have determined that fundamental
principles form the foundation for all of our civil and political institutions.'
Similarly, the concurring judges properly relied upon jurisprudential tradition as
the guidepost for evaluating the principle of presumption of innocence. For more
than a century, courts have revered the principle of the presumption of innocence as
"undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary."' However, in the same generation that
these words were first written, a well-known Justice noted: "It is greatly to be feared
that the so-called presumption of innocence in favor of the prisoner at the bar is a
pretence, a delusion, and empty sound. It ought not to be, but - it is."'" Neverthe-
less, the presumption of innocence has maintained its place of prominence, at least
in principle.' Over the years, courts have continued to refer to this principle as the
"touchstone of American criminal jurisprudence,' u the "cornerstone of Anglo-Saxon
justice,""D and an essential component of a fair trial."
However, century-old theory does not always translate to modem-day method. In
practice, the presumption of innocence is generally recognized as a shorthand
description of the right of the accused to prove nothing until the prosecution has
"taken up its burden and produced evidence and effected persuasion."'9 This brand
of innocence generally connotes a mere reminder for jurors of the burden of proof
allocated to the state.' Therefore, courts and jurors rarely assume that the accused
is innocent in fact.91
One nationwide survey has revealed that over 50% of the participants felt that a
criminal defendant should be required to take the stand to prove his innocence.' As
which are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our.people as to be ranked as fundamental").
81. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,284-85 (1983) (verifying a principle as fundamental because
it is "deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence").
82. See Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926) (holding as fundamental those concepts
which "lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions").
83. See Flores, 896 P.2d at 561 (citing Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
84. See William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 337 (1995) (quoting
Justice Darling, in JOHN H. WIGMORE, EViDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 531 (1981)).
85. See George P. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-
Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 880 nn.1-3 (1968) (noting the universal
praise for the presumption of innocence, illustrated by numerous statutes and international declarations
on human rights). But see United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Hand, J.) ("Our
procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream.
What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and
defeats the prosecution of crime.").
86. People v. Layhew, 548 N.E.2d 25, 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
87. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JuDIcIAL PRocEss 96 (1993).
88. See Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 790 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
89. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484 n.12 (1978).
90. See LeRoy Pemell, The Reign of the Queen of Hearts: The Declining Significance of the
Presumption of Innocence, 37 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 393, 393-94 (1989) (discussing the erosion of the
presumption of innocence principle in the early 1970s to become simply a rule of evidence which allows
the defendant to stand mute at trial).
91. See Laufer, supra note 84, at 350-51.
92. See Philip D. Bush & John M. Stuart, The Future of Voir Dire in Minnesota: Fair Juries or
1996]
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no surprise, juries in criminal cases have been confused even when the jury
instructions were adequate.' In one instance, a jury viewed a videotape of a patterh
jury instruction stating that the defendant should be presumed innocent until proven
guilty and without n!eding to present any evidence to prove his innocence." Only
50% of the jury understood that the defendant did not need to prove his innocence
to be acquitted.'
Even advocates of the fundamental principle of the presumption of innocence have
contributed to the confusion. Justice Thurgood Marshall noted: "[O]ur fundamental
principles of justice declare that the defendant is as innocent on the day before his
trial as he is on th,- morning after his acquittal."' However, this statement is
inaccurate. A defendant is presumed to be innocent before trial and, upon acquittal,
is found to be "not guilty." According to Justice Marshall, the jury instruction in
Flores, which directed the jury to presume the defendant "not guilty," would not be
error at all.
Of course, the increasingly common mistake of interpreting "innocence" as merely
a means of allocating the burden of persuasion to the state does not merit subjecting
its violation to harmless error analysis. Failing to presume the defendant to be
innocent in fact would call into question the fundamental fairness of the trial.' As
a result, the courts of various states have recognized the presumption of innocence
as a fundamental doctrine of American jurisprudence.7 In these states, the failure
to adequately charge the jury concerning the defendant's presumption of innocence
requires a new trial.'
In addition to relying on jurisprudential tradition, the concurring opinions in the
Flores denial of rehearing linked the statutory protection of presumption of innocence
to the due process clause as a "companion principle."'" The concurring judges
reasoned that a defective instruction concerning the presumption of innocence diluted
False Expediency?, 38 BENCH & B. MINN. 39, 43 (1981).
93. See David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, in 59
JUDICATURE 478, 480-82 (1976).
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 764 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. See Laufer, sup.ra note 84, at 348; see also Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention:
Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. Ray. 371, 404 (1970) (urging a
"commitment to the proposition that a man who stands accused of crime is no less entitled than his
accuser to freedom and respect as an innocence member of the community").
98. See Dennard v. State, 454 S.E.2d 629, 630 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); see also People v. Cross, 650
N.E.2d 1047, 1055 (111. App. Ct. 1995) (upholding defendant's "fundamental right to the presumption of
innocence").
99. See Dennard, 454 S.E.2d at 630.
100. See Flores v. State, 899 P.2d 1162, 1169 (Okla. Crim. App.) (Order Denying Rehearing)
(Strubhar, J., concurring secially),tcert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 548 (1995); see also id. at 1164 (Chapel,
V.P.J., concurring specially) (arguing that defective presumption of innocence jury instruction is harmful




or lessened the "burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,.'. thereby denying
what has been deemed a constitutional guarantee." z
This reasoning is consistent with the United States Supreme Court decisions which
defined fundamental principles as those grounded in the concept of due process."
Like Oklahoma, other state courts have viewed the presumption of innocence as a
necessary component of due process."°' However, the United States Supreme Court
has refused to mandate a presumption of innocence instruction."° In Kentucky v.
Whorton,"° the Court determined that an omission of the instruction would not
require a reversal if the accused was not deprived of "due process of law in light of
the totality of the circumstances."'" Whorton affirmed the Court's position in an
earlier decision that the particular phrase "presumption of innocence" was not
mandatory as long as other due pr6cess requirements were met."°8 Specifically, a
criminal trial must afford the accused the right to be proven guilty beyond a
101. Id. at 1166 (Chapel, V.P.J., concurring specially) (noting that the presumption of not guilty
instruction diluted defendant's constitutional rights to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt); see
also id. at 1168 (Strubhar, J., concurring specially) (remarking that even the dissenting judges agreed that
erroneous instruction lessened the burden of proof).
102. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (establishing that Due Process Clause requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the charged crime); see also Sullivan
v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993) (holding an instructional error of a misdescription of the
burden of proof not subject to harmless error review).
103. See Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16 (1978) (holding that fundamental principles include
procedural fairness); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359 (1972) (defining as fundamental those
concepts deemed essential for protection of life and liberty); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 741
(1948) (Burton, J., dissenting) (deeming as fundamental those principles which call for the careful and
sympathetic observance of due process of law that is guaranteed to all accused persons); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (holding as fundamental those rights implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty).
104. See State v. Adams, 623 A.2d 42, 52 (Conn. 1993) (equating presumption of innocence
instructional errors with burden of proof and elements of offense which are constitutional in nature);
Dennard v. State, 454 S.E.2d 629, 630 (Ga. CL App. 1995) (holding in all criminal cases tried upon plea
of not guilty, the presumption of innocence is a fundamental doctrine of American jurisprudence and
failure to adequately charge the jury is an error requiring a new trial); People v. Cross, 650 N.E.2d 1047,
1055 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (noting defendants fundamental right to presumption of innocence); People v.
Coss, 521 N.W.2d 312, 324 (Mich. 1994) (Brickley, J., concurring) (contending that error infringing
upon presumption of innocence deprives defendant of fair trial and is therefore due process violation).
Compare the above cases with Sevits v. State, 651 N.E.2d 278, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding error
not reversible error and contending that presumption of innocence not intended to shield the guilty but
for the protection of the innocent to guard against conviction of unjustly accused), and People v.
Hawthorne, 841 P.2d 118, 137 (Cal. 1992) (finding due process not mandating use of particular phrase
presumption of innocence as long as court's charge to jury conveys substance of principle).
105. See Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789-90 (1979).
106. 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
107. Id. at 790. "[Sluch a failure must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances -
including all the instructions to the jury, the arguments of counsel, whether the weight of the evidence
was overwhelming, and other relevant features - to determine whether the defendant received a
constitutionally fair trial." Id. at 789.
108. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1978).
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reasonable doubt, and the defendant must be judged solely by evidence adduced at
trial. 09
Judge Chapel's concurring opinion distinguished'Whorton from Flores based on
the facts."' Rather than merely omitting the instruction, the trial judge in Flores
instructed the jury to presume the defendant "not guilty."' Unlike the error in
Whorton, such an instruction could produce jury confusion concerning any correct
instruction on the remsonable doubt rule.
While the Supreme Court has yet to rule on a defective presumption of innocence
instruction, some commentators have suggested that this error is distinct from an
omission and should be beyond the bounds of harmless error."' Regardless of the
Supreme Court's silence on this issue, Oklahoma law requires an adequate jury
instruction on the pTesumption of innocence. Therefore, the next question addressed
by the concurring opinions was the source of law governing the application of the
harmless error doctrine.
B. State Harmless Error Law Governs Rather Than Federal Law
Judge Chapel's concurring opinion presented a second argument which emphasized
the source of law governing the harmless error doctrine and the state statute
mandating the presumption of innocence jury instruction. Judge Chapel's concurring
opinion contended that the dissenting judges mistakenly followed the more liberal
federal standards rather than the state harmless error statute."' For almost a
century, this state statute has permitted reversal for "substantial violations of a
statutory or constitutional right."
' 4
However, in analyzing which violations are substantial, Oklahoma courts have
explicitly incorporated much of the federal harmless error doctrine into state case
law." '5 For instance, the state courts have adopted the federal standards for non-
109. See id. "While use of the particular phrase 'presumption of evidence' - or any other form of
words - may not be constitutionally mandated, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
must be held to safeguard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 790-91.
110. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1166 (Order Denying Rehearing) (Chapel, V.P.J., concurring specially).
111. See id. (Chapel, V.P.J., concurring specially).
112. See Laufer, supra note 84, at 398 (urging state courts to restore the importance of the
presumption of innocence by reexamining harmless error application to defective and omitted
presumption of innocence instructions).
113. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1164 (Order Denying Rehearing) (Chapel, V.P.J., concurring specially).
Judge Chapel could have been referring to Judge Lumpkin's proposition that the federal standard for
nonconstitutional errors set forth in United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990), was
the appropriate standard rather than the Chapman test which has been explicitly adopted by Oklahoma
courts for constitutional errors. Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 702 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994), appeared
to adopt the federal standard for nonconstitutional errors. See infra note 116. Apparently, Judge Chapel
believes that either Simpron did not adopt the Rivera standard for all nonconstitutional errors or that the
.error was a constitutionri violation. See infra note 119.
114. See Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 695-702 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (discussing the history
of the state harmless error statute).
115. See Pickens v. State, 885 P.2d 678, 682 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (applying the federal courts'




constitutional"16 and some constitutional errors."7  In fact, Judge Chapel has
described the statute as codifying the Chapman v. California.. harmless error
analysis."9 Thus, Oklahoma courts have regularly applied federal law in "determin-
ing the scope, the method, and the application of harmless error analysis." 20
While some of the federal decisions which are more restrictive of defendants' due
process rights have not been directly accepted,' federal case law has provided
guidance in formulating the framework for the state harmless error doctrine.
Ironically, in assessing whether the defective jury instruction in Flores was
susceptible to harmless error analysis, both the concurring and the dissenting opinions
bolstered their positions with analogies to United States Supreme Court decisions."
The concurring opinions compared the rights that were violated," whereas the
dissenting opinions focused on the violation itself."
P.2d 690, 702 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (applying federal harmless error standard for nonconstitutional
errors); Bartell v. State, 881 P.2d 92, 98-99 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (using federal courts distinction
between structural and trial errors in determining whether to apply harmless error doctrine).
116. See Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 702 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (citing United States v.
Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990)).
117. See Bartell v. State, 881 P.2d 92, 99 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that due to
overwhelming evidence of guilt, admission of a videotape into evidence at trial, though violating
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
118. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
119. See Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 705 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (Chapel, J., dissenting).
120. Flores, 899 P.2d at 1175 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting); see also Cooper v. State, 889 P.2d 293,
308 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (commenting that the state "is empowered to use federal law in analyzing
questions of state law").
121. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, for instance, has not passed on whether coerced
confessions are subject to harmless error analysis.
122. Judge Chapel compared the purposes underlying the presumption of innocence instructions
mentioned in Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1978), but distinguished an omission from a defective
instruction. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1165-66 (Chapel, V.P.J., concurring specially) (citing Kentucky v.
Whorton, 441 U.S. 786,790-91 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (opining that the omission of presumption
of innocence instruction is subject to harmless error review)). Judge Strubhar compared the right to
presumption of innocence with the right to reasonable doubt standard in criminal trials. See id. at 1168
(Strubhar, J., concurring specially) (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2082-83 (1993)
(holding a misdescription of the burden of proof to be a structural error, not subject to harmless error
review)). Judge Lumpkin's dissent compared the defective jury instruction to an omitted instruction,
when the burden of proof instruction was adequate. See id. at 1175 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting) (citing
Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 788-89 (1978) (refraining from constitutionally mandating a
presumption of innocence instruction in every case)). Judge Lumpkin's dissent also distinguished the
misdescription of the burden of proof from the defect in the presumption of innocence instruction. See
id. at 1174 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting) (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993) (holding the
failure to give an adequate "beyond a reasonable doubt instruction" not subject to harmless error
analysis)).
123. The concurrences compared the presumption of innocence instruction to the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" instruction. For a discussion of a comparison of the presumption of innocence and
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, see generally Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and
the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HAsTINGs L.J. 457 (1989).
124. The dissents compared a defective instruction with an omitted instruction of presumption of
innocence, when the burden of proof standard was adequately described in both cases. See Flores v.
State, No. F-93-977, 1995 WL 500467, at *11 (Okla. Crim. App. June 27, 1995).
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Regardless of which approach is preferable, both the dissenting and the concurring
opinions looked to federal law for guidance in interpreting a state statute. Of course,
the state courts have discretion in formulating a state harmless error doctrine which
affords greater rights to the accused than the constitutional minimum." Therefore,
the real issue is not whether to apply federal law but rather how to apply the state
harmless error standard.
C. The Role of the Court in Appellate Review
Both Judge Chapel's and Judge Strubhar's concurring opinions presented a third
argument which centered on the role of the court in appellate review. The court's
conflict concerning the application of the harmless error doctrine led the dissenting
and the concurring opinions in Flores to reach opposite conclusions." The
different outcomes, however, stemmed from contrasting views on the court's role in
appellate review. Judge Lumpkin's dissent identified the purpose of a trial by jury as
fairness, measured by the jury's attainment of an "accurate result."" The concur-
ring opinions, on the other hand, focused on the accuracy of the trial process. In
addition, the concurring opinions advocated a role of judicial restraint based on the
reviewing court's relationship with the following four entities: the legislature, the trial
jury, the trial judge, and the state political mechanism.
1. Role of the Court in Relation to the Legislature
When faced with uncertainty in statutory construction, courts traditionally have
strived to fashion law in accordance with the intent of the legislature.'" Further,
judge-made criminal laws have been disfavored. 9 In recent generations, jurists and
scholars have proposed that the Supreme Court, as well as other reviewing courts,
should play a significant role in defining public policy."3 In Flores, Judge Chapel's
concurring opinion to the order denying a rehearing voiced reservations against
following the more recent and more expansive practices of the Court, both in terms
of judicial activity and in applying the harmless error analysis to violations of
substantial rights.'
125. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291,300 (1982) ("State law may recognize liberty interests more
extensive than those ind-pendently provided by the Federal Constitution."); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714, 719 (1975).
126. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1163 (Order Denying Rehearing).
127. See id. at 1171 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting) (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986)); see
also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308 (1991).
128. See BENJAMIN CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14-15 (1921).
129. See SANFORD H. KADISH Er AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 354 (4th ed. 1983).
130. See Sanford Levinson, The Court of Today and the Lessons of History, in ROGER G.
MCCLOsKEY, THE AMEItICAN SUPREME COURT 207 (2d ed. 1994). The author noted that "[there had
grown up a generation ofjurists and scholars convinced that the Court's judges were conscious molders
of policy and that the Constitution had left open many questions about its own meaning, including the
question of the Court's proper role." Id.; see also John W. Poulos, The Judicial Philosophy of Roger
Traynor, 46 HASTINGs L.J. 1643, 1708-10 (1995) (analyzing the realists view that promoted a symbiotic
relationship between the court and the legislature).




Judge Chapel argued for judicial restraint in appellate review, giving deference to
statutes enacted by "the citizens of Oklahoma, speaking through the State Legis-
lature."'3 His concurring opinion suggested that the citizens are free to pursue their
goals of altering these statutes at the legislative level if they so choose.' Further,
he reasoned that the court is not free to "abort the law by judicial fiat.""
Likewise, Judge Lumpkin's dissent advocated judicial self-restraint. However, he
proposed that the Flores majority's interpretation of the harmless error statute violated
the underlying legislative intent. "5 Judge Lumpkin pointed to the legislative dictates
preferring the affirmation of convictions when the error could not possibly have
affected the outcome of the trial.'3
While Judge Lumpkin's dissent indicated that Flores should have included an
applicable standard for a "substantial violation,"'37 the majority interpreted the
harmless error statute textually. Though some commentators view the court's duty
as formulating a workable definition for "substantial,'3 8 the courts of other
jurisdictions have similarly interpreted such statutes. In any event, the Oklahoma
courts have explicitly applied the federal terminology in defining a "substantial
violation" as one which so affects the entire structure of the trial as to defy harmless
error analysis.'39
2. Role of the Court in Relation to the Jury
Although the United States Supreme Court has not definitively selected one
harmless error standard, the Harrington v. California' "overwhelming-evidence"
test previously described' is commonly applied. One problem with subjecting
errors to this type of harmless error analysis is that it generally places a reviewing
court in the awkward role of factfinder. As dispassionate arbiters of the law,
appellate courts are poor finders of fact.42 For example, the reviewing court would
be unable to discern the error's effect on the mind of the juror without hearing or
seeing the live testimony.
132. Id. at 1167 (Chapel, V.P.J., concurring specially).
133. See id. at 1168 (Chapel, V.P.J., concurring specially).
134. Id. at 1167 (Chapel, V.P.J., concurring specially).
135. See id. at 1172 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting) (noting the legislative principles of finality of
convictions and fairness at trial).
136. See id. at 1171 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting) (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986)
(recognizing the central purpose of the trial as the factual question of the defendant's guilt)).
137. See id at 1177 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting).
138. See Addison K. Goff, IV, Variations of a Common Theme: An Analysis of Louisiana's
Experience With Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 53 LA. L. REV. 1577, 1594 (1993).
139. See Bartell v. State, 881 P.2d 92, 98-99 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (applying the rationale of
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 280 (1991)).
140. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
141. See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 1342-45.
142. See Brown, supra note 5, at 19 (noting that appellate courts are in the "worst possible position"
to determine the facts). Proponents of harmless error doctrine claim that such an analysis "reflects
deference to the trial-level sentencer" and that "review for harmless error is almost a routine undertaking
of appellate courts." Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 773 n.23 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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Another criticism of such second-guessing is that the appellate court would be
usurping the role of the jury, skewing the delicate balance between the trial and
appellate roles.43 A prominent United States Supreme Court Justice has similarly
argued that "it is not the appellate court's function to determine guilt or in-
nocence."'" Rather, the appellate court must evaluate the "impact of the thing done
wrong on the minds of the other men, not on one's own, in the total setting."1
45
In Flores, the court refused to assume the role of factfinder.'" When such a
substantial error had influenced the jury's decision making, the reviewing court's
evaluation of the error's impact on the minds of the jurors would amount to pure
speculation. The automatic reversal of such errors will undoubtedly extend the
lengthy appeals process for criminal trials containing an erroneous jury instruction.
However, the reversals protect the jury's role, thus ensuring the defendants of due
process rights to a trial by a fair and impartial jury.
3. Role of the Appellate Court in Relation to the Trial Court
Courts and commentators have recognized the government's preference for the
Harrington "overwhelming-evidence" test."4 While this standard is neither clear nor
necessarily strict, the government can argue for truth seeking rather than discussing
error which is often attributable to its own actions.4 ' In Flores, Judge Strubhar's
concurring opinion rejected the dissent's proposition that a defective presumption of
innocence jury instruction should ever be subjected to the "overwhelming error"
test."5 The practical result of finding the error harmful per se is holding the lower
court and its officers accountable for the error which they themselves may inject into
the trial. In effect, neither judicial sloppiness nor purposeful shortcuts concerning the
defendant's presumption of innocence would be permitted.
143. See Carter, sapra note 4, at 140 (noting that our system of law is based on lay jurors as
factfinders and the appellate courts as reviewing errors of law); see also Goldberg, supra note 17, at 429
(contending that an appellate court defies common sense when stepping outside its tradition role of
review court and attempts to operate as factfinder).
144. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 516 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
145. Id. (Stevens, .. , concurring).
146. The court, instead, reversed and remanded the case so that the evidence could be weighed by
the appropriate finders of fact in a criminal trial, the jury. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1166 (Order Denying
Rehearing) (Chapel, V.PJ., concurring specially) (reasoning that the jury was biased by the erroneous
instruction and were therefore not impartial finders of fact); see also id. at 1168 (Strubhar, J., concurring
specially) (refusing to engage in pure speculation as to what a reasonable jury would have done),
Holding that the error was reversible per se means that an appellate court will never replace the jury as
factfinder when the presumption of innocence has been violated in a criminal trial.
147. See Brown, supra note 5, at 19 (arguing for expansion of errors not subject to Harmless Error
Review "in order to give substance to the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial").
148. See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 1365.
149. See id at 1356 (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (recognizing that lay jury
is designed to prevent oppression by government)).
150. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1168 (Strubhar, J., concurring specially); see also id. at 1165, 1167




Commentators have recognized the reviewing court as, at the very least, a "neutral"
referee, which ensures that each party play by the rules." Similarly, the concurring
opinions in Flores described the appellate court's role as a shield against governmen-
tal violations of constitutional and statutory safeguards." Thus, while refraining
from actively offending either the legislative intent or the jury's findings, the court
assumed a defensive stance in protecting the due process rights of the accused.
4. Role of the Court in Relation to the Political Mechanism
In an era when Supreme Court Justices are often viewed as political pawns, their
state court counterparts, who are not afforded the same security of a lifetime
appointment, could be influenced by voters. In addition, the increasing crime rate has
spurred public demand for swift convictions. The public's dissatisfaction with lengthy
appeals has, in turn, pressured appellate courts to liberally apply the harmless error
doctrine."
Similarly, Judge Strubhar's concurring opinion recognized the temptation to allow
public opinion to sway the court." The oath of the court is as an impartial
interpreter of the laws rather than as elected representative.5 ' However, the fact that
under Oklahoma law each candidate to the bench is subject to approval by popular
vote for retention" could place a judge in a position of compromise. When popular
opinion runs counter to the preservation of a fundamental right such as the
presumption of innocence, each judge is required by oath to uphold that right even
at the expense of losing a seat on the bench."
V. Ramifications of Flores
In Oklahoma, as well as in most states, the scope of the harmless error doctrine
as it applies to a specific constitutional error in a criminal trial may be evaluated
according to the two components set forth in Chapman v. California.' However,
under Flores, defective presumption of innocence jury instructions will never reach
the second step but will be automatically reversed. 9 Despite this clear ruling,
151. See Levinson, supra note 130, at 219.
152. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1169 (Strubhar, J., concurring specially).
153. See Carter, supra note 4, at 126.
154. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1169 (Strubhar, J., concurring specially); see also id at 1165 (Chapel,
V.P.J., specially concurring) (noting that the court has a sworn duty to reverse trial courts if they do not
follow the law).
155. See id. at 1169 (Strubhar, J., concurring specially) ("Each member of this Court has sworn an
oath to uphold the law and apply it without regard to public opinion, retention elections, and the number
of cases affected.")
156. See 20 OKLA. STAT. § 33 (1991).
157. See OKLA. CONST. art. 15, § I (providing oath of office for all public officers).
158. 386 U.S. 18 (1967); see Daniel Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1, 11 (1994) (noting that all state courts have been assumed to be obliged to apply
Chapman when reviewing criminal convictions). The Chapman test is the following: first, determine
whether the constitutional error is subject to harmless error review; and second, determine whether the
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 20-24; see also Greabe, supra
note 10, at 826.
159. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1168 (Strnbhar, J., concurring specially). Recognizing that the
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Flores provides little light to guide the future decisions of the court in regard to other
statutory errors of constitutional import. Further, this decision possibly could be
interpreted to establish a standard of harmless error analysis contrary to prior
Oklahoma law."w
A. Flores and Harmless Error Analysis Under Prior Oklahoma Law
The majority in the original Flores opinion appeared to follow the well-established
Chapman test."' Application of this standard could cloud the distinction between
clearly constitutional errors and statutory errors which have constitutional import. In
Flores, the court recognized that an instruction on the presumption of innocence is
not constitutionally required in every case." However, the defective presumption
of innocence instruction was deemed to have diluted the burden of proof, which is
constitutionally mandated to be "beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal cases."
Thus, the majority in the original decision reasoned that this error resulted in a
"denial of Appellant's constitutional and statutory rights."'"
Judge Lumpkin'; concurrence to the original Flores opinion rejected categorizing
this error as constitutional.' 65 In Simpson v. State," the court applied the federal
standard for nonconstitutional error." 7 In contrast to the Chapman constitutional
concurring judges reascned that such an error can be harmless if the evidence of guilt is overwhelming,
Judge Strubhar contended, "This surely cannot be. If the instruction is this case lessens the burden of
proof, an identical instruction in another case must also have the same effect regardless of the evidence
of guilt." Id. (Strubhar, J., concurring specially).
160. In Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 702 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994), the court distinguished
between constitutional and nonconstitutional errors in applying harmless error analysis. For
nonconstitutional errors, the court advocated a test which analyzed whether the court had grave doubts
that the error had a subrtantial influence on the outcome of the trial. See id. Courts in the future could
interpret Flores as eliminating the distinction between the tests for nonconstitutional and constitutional
errors, since the error in Flores was defined as nonconstitutional.
161. See Flores v. State, 896 P.2d 558, 560 (Okla. Crim. App.) (reasoning that upon finding error,
the court must next "determine whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" and citing
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967)), reh'g denied, 899 P.2d 1162 (Okla. Crim. App.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 548 (1995).
162. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1165 (Order Denying Rehearing) (Chapel, V.P.J., concurring specially)
(citing Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1978)).
163. See id. (Chaplr, V.P.J., concurring specially).
164. Flores, 896 P.2d at 559.
165. See id. at 563 (Lumpkin, J., concurring in result).
166. 876 P.2d 690 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
167. See id. at 702.
Appellant has not raised a constitutional error; he has raised an error which occurred as
a result of the court's failure to adhere to the dictates of a state statute. We have not
addressed this pirticular aspect to any appreciable extent ... In United States v. Rivera,
... the appellata court noted that in non-constitutional situations, an error is harmless
unless it has a 'substantial influence' on the outcome, or leaves the reviewing court in
'grave doubt' as to whether it has such an effect.... We believe this to be a fair standard
and use it here.... Therefore, we hold the error of the trial court ... does not mandate
reversal in this case. We do so because we have no 'grave doubts' this failure had a
'substantial influ.-nee' on the outcome of the trial.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol49/iss3/6
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error test,'" Simpson held a nonconstitutional error harmless unless it had a
"substantial influence" in the outcome or leaves the reviewing court in "grave
doubt."69 Additionally, Simpson placed the burden on the defendant, rather than the
state, to show the error and that injury resulted.'70
The impact of Flores on Simpson's standard of review for nonconstitutional errors
is not clear. Lower courts could read Flores as categorizing the defective jury
instruction as solely a statutory violation. The practical effect of such an interpreta-
tion would mean applying the Chapman test uniformly for both statutory and
constitutional errors.
On the other hand, it could be that the majority ingeniously connected a statutory
violation of presumption of innocence with the established constitutional right of a
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Under this interpretation, Flores would
neither invalidate the nonconstitutional harmless error analysis under Simpson nor
read between the lines of United States Supreme Court decisions by inventing a new
constitutional mandate.
Ultimately, Flores does not explicitly revise existing Oklahoma standards of
harmless error review. However, the decision does appear to limit Simpson's
nonconstitutional harmless error analysis by removing from its reach such errors
which indirectly affect constitutional rights. Therefore, at the very least, Flores could
leave lower courts confused about when or if to apply the various harmless error tests
under Oklahoma law.
B. Flores and the Future of the Harmless Error Doctrine
Although the concurring opinions to the order denying the rehearing affirmed that
the defective presumption of innocence jury instruction requires an automatic
reversal,' the majority opinion was not so clear. Two defects in the original Flores
opinion left the door open to erroneous interpretations.
First, the majority applied the Chapman test" yet reasoned that "we must now
determine whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt or goes to the
foundation of the case constituting a substantial violation of a constitutional or
statutory right."'" Under Chapman, however, harmlessness becomes a factor only
once an error has been determined to be amenable to harmless error analysis."
Thus, courts in the future could look to Flores as subjecting the defective jury
168. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967).
169. See Simpson, 876 P.2d at 702 (citing United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir.
1990)).
170. See id. at 701.
171. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1164 (Order Denying Rehearing) (Chapel, V.P.J., concurring specially)
("A minority, however, has concluded that in some cases, if proof of guilt is sufficiently strong and there
are no additional errors, this instructional error can be deemed harmless. I find this kind of analysis
alarming.").
172. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21-22.
173. Flores, 896 P.2d at 560.
174. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22. "We conclude the there may be some constitutional errors which
in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the
Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction." ld.
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instruction to harmless error review. The practical effect is that courts could
distinguish Flores if the state proves that a similar error is "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." 7s
Second, in the criginal Flores opinion, the majority reasoned that the "actual
impact of the instruction.., on the judgment of the jurors is difficult to deter-
mine."'76 The "impact in the mjnd of the jury" has been a means of assessing the
harmlessness of an error which has already crossed the Chapman threshold."
Again, Flores could be mistakenly read by lower courts as subjecting this error to the
two-step analysis but finding it harmless.
Judge Strubhar's concurring opinion denying rehearing attempted to cure these
defects by defining this error as "structural."'" This terminology referenced a
United States Supreme Court decision which categorized errors as either "structural"
or "trial" and held that structural errors, in contrast to trial errors, are never
susceptible to harmless error analysis!" The original Flores opinion, however,
neglected to place this error in either category, appearing instead to apply the second
step of the Chapman test as the threshold.
Despite clarifying that the defective jury instruction is harmful per se, Judge
Strubhar's concurring opinion could have clouded the judgment of lower courts by
the discussion of "plain error." Judge Strubhar contended that "it is unfortunate that
the dissent now finds the need to retreat from the original Flores decision in the
wake of several reversals based on the plain error found in this case."" Further,
Judge Strubhar summaarized the concurring opinion with: "The trial court's erroneous
instruction altering the presumption of innocence to a presumption of not guilty
amounts to plain error."
Simpson v. State' defined "plain error" as error deserving of review on appeal
even though it was not preserved through timely objection at trial."' Simpson
disposed of the possibility that all plain errors would require automatic reversal and
held that plain error may be found harmless." Therefore, the Flores reversal could
not have been based solely on plain error unless Simpson were overturned. Since the
175. Flores, 896 P.2d at 560 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967)).
176. Id. at 561.
177. See United States v. Hill, 901 F.2d 880, 884-85 (10th Cir. 1990) (using the "probable impact
in the minds of the average jury" test established in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,254 (1969),
as a measure for determiing whether error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
178. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1168 (Order Denying Rehearing) (Strubhar, J., concurring specially)
(citing Sullivan v. Louisitaa, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993) (holding defective burden of proof instruction
to be structural and therefore outside the bounds of harmless error review)).
179. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,306-12 (1991) (distinguishing "structural" and 'trial"
errors).
180. Flores, 899 P.2d at 1169 (Order Denying Rehearing) (Strubhar, J., concurring specially); id.
at 1165 ("A majority of this Court is convinced that Flores must be applied to all other such cases.").
181. ld. (Strubhar, J., concurring specially).
182. 876 P.2d 690 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
183. See id. at 693.
184. See id. at 694 (overruling Spears v. State, 805 P.2d 681 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (holding that




original Flores opinion cited Simpson twice,"r the majority obviously did not intend
to displace the precedent concerning the meaning of plain error or its susceptibility
to harmless error review. Thus, while indicating that the court may be attempting to
narrow the scope of harmless error analysis, Flores could create confusion concerning
the doctrine's application.
VI. Judicial and Legislative Alternatives in Applying the Harmless Error Analysis
The majority in the original Flores opinion refused to judicially legislate a
definition for "substantial violation" in the harmless error statute, preferring instead
a textual interpretation." Judicial and legislative alternatives remain which could
provide more predictability in assessing when and how to apply this doctrine as well
as prevent instructional errors at trial.
A. Judicial Alternatives and Judicial Duty
In Flores, the majority may have been sending a message to the Oklahoma
Legislature to revise the harmless error statute to account for competing public
policies." Other courts have not relied so stringently on their elected representa-
tives to formulate a framework within which the substance of violations may be
evaluated.' For example, Texas has a harmless error rule, which codified
Chapman's "contribute to the verdict test."'" In applying this rule, the Texas court
has attempted to maintain a balance of its policies by providing factors with which
other reviewing courts can work."9
However, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals could pursue options which
would provide greater uniformity within the existing standards of harmless error
review while maintaining the majority's stance of judicial restraint."' For instance,
185. See Flores, 896 P.2d at 560 (citing Simpson as authority for plain error review and for
application of state harmless error statute).
186. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1164 (Order Denying Rehearing) (Chapel, V.P.J., concurring specially).
In Simpson, Judge Lumpkin, the author of the majority opinion, noted that the Oklahoma Supreme Court
had defined "substantial" in the harmless error context as "matter of substance as distinguished from
matter of mere form." Simpson, 876 P.2d at 694 (quoting Davis v. Williams, 76 P.2d 251, 252 (Okla.
1938)).
187. In his concurrence to the order denying the rehearing, Judge Chapel defended the majority's
refusal to "judicially legislate" a standard for when an error is a "substantial violation."
If the citizens of this State wish to alter our statutory requirement that juries in criminal
trials be instructed that defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty, they are free
to pursue their goals at the State legislative level. In the meantime, trial judges are bound
by the rules which the people have enacted.
Flores, 899 P.2d at 1167-68 (Order Denying Rehearing) (Chapel, V.PJ., concurring specially). For a
discussion about these conflicting policies determining the outcome of a trial, see Carter, supra note 4,
at 139.
188. See Goff, supra note 138, at 1590-91 (citing TEX. R. ApP. P. 81(b)(2) (1986)).
189. See idt The Texas rule provides: "If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in
the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate
court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to
the punishment." TEx. R. APP. P. 81(b)(2) (1986).
190. See Goff, supra note 138, at 1590-91.
191. Judge Strubhar urged: "Over our history our principles have slowly, through our eftorts, grown
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the court could clarify its position regarding the specific tests for constitutional and
nonconstitutional errors. Simpson could be explicitly reaffirmed to apply to
nonconstitutional errors"n while the Chapman standard could be retained for
constitutional errors.,.'
Alternatively, -the harmless error statute could be formally interpreted as codifying
Chapman. Like the Texas harmless error rule, the tests for constitutional and
nonconstitutional violations would be identical. Adopting a uniform standard would
eliminate any neces-sity for judicial slight of hand in categorizing an error. Therefore,
the court could focus on whether an error passed the Chapman threshold and should
be subject to harmless error analysis.
To answer the threshold question in Chapman, Oklahoma courts have adopted the
federal court's distinction between trial errors and structural errors.'9 However, the
majority in the original Flores opinion did not mention this test nor even attempt to
categorize the violated jury instruction as structural.19" As an additional source of
confusion, the question of "harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt" has presented
lower courts with a variety of inconsistently applied standards. The United States
Supreme Court has provided three tests to assess harmlessness: the Chapman
"contribute to the verdict" test,"9 the Harrington v. California"9' "overwhelming-
more durable, more expansive, and more just. Yet, principles alone cannot protect us if we lack the
courage, and the self-restraint, to protect ourselves." Flores, 899 P.2d at 1169 (Order Denying
Rehearing) (Strubhar, J., concurring specially). Judge Chapel agreed: "Even if the law is found wanting
on trial, it is better that its defects should be demonstrated and removed than that the law should be
aborted by judicial fiat." Id. at 1167 (Chapel, V.P.J., concurring specially) (quoting American Fed'n of
Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 553 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
192. The Simpson test for nonconstitutional errors is whether the review court has grave doubts the
error did not have a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial. See Simpson, 876 P.2d at 702.
193. The Chapman two-part test for constitutional errors is whether the error is amenable to
harmless error review anti whether it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, See Chapman, 386 U.S.
at 21-22.
194. See Bartell v. Slate, 881 P.2d 92,98-99 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279, 306-12 (1990) (holding that only rare structural errors are exempt from harmless error
analysis and that trial errors are subject to harmless error analysis)).
195.. Some commentators have criticized the premise underlying the trial-structural distinction as
inaccurate and overbroad. See Carter, supra note 4, at 139 (citing Charles J. Ogletree, Arizona v.
Fulminante, The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REy. 152,
161 (1991)). The underlying premise that the appellate court could not determine the correctness of the
result with structural errors is flawed, because the "structure" of a structural error is a fair trial. See id.
at 141. A fair trial is defined according to the correctness of the result, thereby muddying the distinction
.between trial and structural errors. See id.; see also Brown, supra note 5, at 18 ("Appellate courts are
relying more and more on the doctrine of harmless error to sidestep important constitutional issues raised
on appeal. This trend is wrong and an example of 'the end justifies the means' mentality, which tolerates
unreasonable searches anJ seizures because large quantities of drugs were found.., and a myriad of
other examples of judicial abuses tolerated on appeal in the name of harmless error.").
196. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967).




evidence" test,9' and the Delaware v. Van Arsdell"' "balancing" test, whiich
considers both the effect of the error and the weight of guilt.'n
Oklahoma courts have applied these three tests to criminal cases in each of the last
five decades.' 1 No apparent trend has emerged in- Oklahoma case law regarding
when and why to favor one test over another. However, studies conducted in other
states have indicated that the Harrington test results in a greater number of
convictions affirmed' whereas the Chapman test produces a greater number of
reversals.' The Van Arsdell test has been noted for its inconsistent and unpredict-
able results.' Review courts enjoy great discretion in choosing which of these tests
to apply. "In effect, a court's choice between the Chapman, Harrington, and Van
Arsdall tests may determine freedom or imprisonment, life or death. ' 7an
In Flores, the court sidestepped this dilemma by automatically reversing all
presumption of innocence jury instructions. However, in the future, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals could systematically identify the criteria for choosing a
harmlessness test under the given circumstances. Without such guidelines, the court
could easily indulge in the same judicial abuse so criticized both by the concurrences
and the dissent in Flores.'
198. See id. at 251-54.
199. 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
200. See id. at 684.
201. Examples of cases in which the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals applied the
"overwhelming-evidence" test include: Douma v. State, 749 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Okla. Caim. App. 1988);
Dunaway v. State, 561 P.2d 103, 105-06 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); Rice v. State, 368 P.2d 507, 513
(1961); Samuels v. State, 290 P.2d 179, 180 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955). Some cases apply the
.overwhelming-evidence" test by looking at the "impact on the mind of the jury" as in the following
cases: Thomas v. State, 811 P.2d 1337, 1343 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); Harris v. State, 558 P.2d 1199,
1203 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977). For examples of the "hybrid" test, see Valdez v. State, 900 P.2d 363,
381 (Okla. Crim. App. (1995); Rojem v. State, 753 P.2d 359,366 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Bias v. State,
561 P.2d 523, 536 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977). For examples of the "contributes to the verdict" test, see
Pickens v. State, 885 P.2d 678, 682 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Prince v. State, 620 P.2d 431, 433 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1980); Brown v. State, 541 P.2d 242, 243 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); Rousek v. State, 228
P.2d 668, 672 (Okla. Crim. App. 1951).
202. See Mitchell, supra note 41, at 1349 (recognizing that twenty of twenty recent cases applying
the "overwhelming-evidence" test resulted in finding harmless error). Because the Harrington test
requires less stringent and more involved review of the trial record, it tends to favor the prosecution.
See id. at 1364.
203. See id. at 1349. Only one of seventeen recent cases applying the "contributes to the verdict"
test resulted in a finding of harmless error. See id. The Chapman test imposes a stricter standard of
review and focuses on the error, thus tending to favor the defendant. See id. at 1364.
204. See id. at 1350. "[A] large gray area exists as to what proof suffices to declare an error
harmless under Van Arsdall." Id at 1360.
205. lal at 1369.
206. Judge Chapel in his concurrence to the denial of a rehearing warned against "the danger in
allowing individuals in positions of power to follow their own personal beliefs rather than the law."
Flores, 899 P.2d at 1166 (Order Denying Rehearing) (Chapel, V.P.J., concurring specially). Judge
Lumpkin in his dissent to the denial of a rehearing criticized judgments arising out of personal feeling
rather than a sense of the law. See id. at 1172 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting) ("Personal distaste for the action
of a single individual ... should not cause the bending of a rule of law.").
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B. Legislative Alternatives in Harmless Error Analysis
While lower courts continue to unevenly apply a variety of harmless error
standards, most of the fifty state harmless error statutes are relatively similar.
Unfortunately, with few exceptions, many of these statutes are similarly vague. As
a result, courts have exercised broad discretion in defining a workable harmless error
doctrine.
Alternatively, legislatures could amend state harmless error statutes to provide
greater specificity and, therefore, consistency. The harmless error statutes of other
jurisdictions could give guidance in determining which party bears the burden of
proof, what that party must prove, and what the reviewing court should consider in
assessing whether the burden has been met.
The Oklahoma harmless error statute provides:
No judgment ;hall be set aside or new trial granted by any appellate
court of this state ... on the ground of misdirection of the jury or for
error in any matter of pleading or procedure, unless it is the opinion of
the reviewing court that the error complained of has probably resulted in
a miscarriage of justice, or constitutes a substantial violation of a
constitutional or statutory right.'
As in many states, Oklahoma's harmless error statute presumes that the conviction
will be upheld.' The Oklahoma statute places the burden on neither the appellant
nor the state and makes no distinction between criminal and civil cases.' This
statute was cited in F!ores, yet the court quoted the federal standard for constitutional
errors of whether the state proved the error "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."' While the court could justify using the federal standard as a means of
disproving a "substantial violation," Flores failed to address why the burden has
shifted to the state for a nonconstitutional plain error!"
The language of the Oklahoma statute parallels the harmless error legislation of
the states which presume errors to be harmless. Among those states, though, the
harmless error statutes do not provide identical means by which the appellant may
rebut the presumption of harmlessness. Most of these statutes present at least one of
two recurring themes as a measurement for harm: miscarriage of justice" and
prejudice in respect to a substantial right!"
207. 20 OKLA. STAT. § 3001.1 (1991).
208. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13; FLA. STAT. ch. 59.041 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
20-701 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2308 (1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 470.05 (McKinney 1994).
209. Judge Lumpldn, in writing for the majority in Simpson, construed the harmless error statute,
20 OKLA. STAT. § 3001.1 (1991), as not allocating the burden either way. See Simpson, 876 P.2d at 701
n.13. However, Simpson allocated the burden for plain errors that are nonconstitutional "on the party
who had the opportunity to correct the error at trial but chose not to." Id.
210. See Flores, 896 P.2d at 560.
211. In Simpson, the court placed the burden on the appellant for nonconstitutional plain error. See
Simpson, 876 P.2d at 701 n.13.
212. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 59.041 (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.26 (West 1982);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2308 (1995).




The Oklahoma harmless error statute clearly adopted the miscarriage of justice
theme by directly incorporating this phrase into the statute. Flores failed to mention
whether the violation of the appellant's right to be presumed innocent amounted to
a miscarriage of justice. However, the court's reasoning in Flores closely resembled
the definition of a judge in another jurisdiction who broadly interpreted "miscarriage
of justice":
When we speak of administering justice in criminal cases .... we mean
something more than merely ascertaining whether an accused is or is not
guilty. It is an essential part of justice that the question of guilt or
innocence shall be determined by an orderly legal procedure, in which
the substantial rights belonging to the defendants shall be respected."4
In addition, the Oklahoma harmless error statute provides a "substantial violation
of a statutory or constitutional right" as a measurement of the error's harm to the
appellant. ' The court in Flores applied the statute's language in form. However,
the majority's reasoning in the original Flores opinion is similar in substance to the
"prejudice in respect to a substantial right" theme 6 As a result, the court looked
to the right that was violated, rather than the substantiality of the violation, in
assessing whether the error was subject to harmless error analysis.
The Oklahoma statute does not expressly define the terms "miscarriage of justice"
and "substantial violation." Rather, the statute leaves discretion to the "opinion of the
reviewing court."2"7 One practical result is that reviewing courts inconsistently apply
a variety of tests for measuring harm. On the other hand, the statutory language also
permits the court to formulate distinct tests for constitutional and statutory errors
while applying the same broad principles to avoid a "miscarriage of justice" or a
"substantial violation" of the appellant's rights.
Of course, the Oklahoma legislature could amend the harmless error statute to both
acknowledge separate tests for constitutional and statutory errors as well as direct the
reviewing court to the applicable test of harm in either case. Greater specificity could
reduce the risk of inconstancy and, thus, the possibility that certain tests are applied
arbitrarily to achieve a certain judgment. However, such specificity might not
account for the variety of possible errors in the proceedings, resulting in both tying
the reviewing court's hands and creating a mountain of new legislation.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 921 (West 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.598 (1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAv § 470.05 (McKinney 1994).
214. People v. Von Villas, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233, 253 (Ct. App. 1995) (Woods, J., dissenting); see
also People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 583 (Mich. 1994) (Riley, J., concurring) (noting that the
vague concept of injustice in the state harmless error statute "certainly does not provide any meaningful
help to appellate courts in reviewing nonconstitutional error").
215. See 20 OKLA. STAT. § 3001.1 (1991).
216. The majority focused on the principle of the presumption of innocence as "undoubted law,
axiomatic, and elementary." Flores, 896 P.2d at 561 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,453
(1895)). Further, the majority classed the presumption of innocence as "one of two 'great cardinal
maxims."' Id. (quoting Miller v. State, 106 P. 538, 539 (Okla. Crim. App. 1910)).
217. 20 OKLA. STAT. § 3001.1 (1991).
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In sum, the solution to the harmless error doctrine's wayward course may lie in
discerning the lesser of two evils, the risk that the court will apply arbitrary standards
of review and the risk that more restrictive legislation could ignore the harm of errors
not yet considered in this jurisdiction. Some commentators have promoted the
alternative of courts retaining discretion in determining the applicable harmless error
test while giving greater specificity to uniform jury instructions!" Therefore, stare
decisis219 would provide the boundaries of discretion in applying harmless error tests
while alternative jury instructions could be devised to better encompass the concept
of the presumption of innocence.
VII. Conclusion
On appeal, few errors escape the reach of harmless error review. However, in
Flores, the court refused to apply the harmless error doctrine to the violation of a
right as fundamental as the presumption of innocence. In effect, cases involving the
erroneous jury instruction of presumption of innocence are automatically reversible,
regardless of the evidence supporting the defendant's guilt.
Despite the subsequent clarification in the order denying the rehearing, the original
Flores opinion remains confusing. The majority failed to articulate that the erroneous
jury instruction was reversible per se and would, therefore, be outside the scope of
harmless error review in all future cases. The ambiguity in Flores could leave courts
in conflict over when and how to apply the harmless error doctrine to similarly
substantial nonconstitutiona violations.
Ideally, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals should amend its original
opinion in Flores so that it says what the court actually means. If it fails to do so,
courts will be called upon in the future to clarify the standards of review for
constitutional and nonconstitutional errors. Additionally, identifying cognizable tests
could provide greater consistency among decisions as well as reduce the tendency
toward personal preferences of decision makers.
Without a clear test, Flores sheds little light to guide appellate courts in
determining which violations of fundamental rights are susceptible to harmless error
analysis. In Flores, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals narrowed the reach of
harmless error review. However, while the court may have changed the direction of
the "wayward course," the doctrine of harmless error is still far from home.
Jeannie Pinkston
218. See Laufer, supra note 84, at 415-19 (providing examples of model jury instructions on
presumption of innocence and suggesting that factual innocence is capable of definition).
219. "Stare decisis" :s defined as: "[R]ule by which common law courts 'are slow to interfere with
principles announced in ... former decisions .... BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 461 (Steven H. Gifis
ed., 3d ed. 1991)
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